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Abstract
The role of foreign witnesses in describing exceptional historical events 
can contribute to the way those events unfold. Three examples serve  to il-
lustrate this: Edgar Snow, Anna Louise Strong and Agnes Smedley. At the 
start of the Chinese communist revolution each of these commentators of-
fered personal testimony to and validation of what became a political myth 
and was elevated to the status of a state political religion with Mao the cen-
tral ﬁgure. This paper discusses the differences between political religion 
and religion tout court. It suggests that the former is more ephemeral while 
the latter is more capable of self-replenishment, leading to the ritualization 
of the ﬁrst in the exercise of state power. It also deals with the question of 
socialism as proto-religion and the problems posed by its disappearance.*
Keywords: Witnessing, presentism, political religion, testimony, discourse, 
Maoism.
Introduction
All great events have commentators whose accounts help shape the way 
these events will be remembered and understood. This is especially the 
case when dealing with exceptional historical moments—moments so 
telling that they constitute ruptures in time, thought and political struc-
ture. The Chinese communist revolution was one such moment. Judge-
ments made about it on the spot, and in context, especially those that 
once appeared deﬁnitive, have so often been subject to periodic revision 
that there is now a history of different interpretations. The revolution has 
become a subject in itself, as succeeding generations of observers go over 
the ground and reinterpret its meaning. In many cases such distancing 
from original events has made for more judicious judgements, as the 
works of Stuart Schram attest. There is a danger though that subsequent 
perspectives may omit and alter facts that loomed signiﬁcant at the time, 
especially to the actual participants. What has been called 'presentism', 
imposing the present on the past, becomes a problem if it distorts the 
perceptual universe of those who were involved at the time. 
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Of course, over time it is inevitable that not only will interpretations 
change, but so too the accuracy of perception and the status of 'facts'. 
A good example is in the diametrically opposed points of view about 
Mao represented by Edgar Snow and Jung Chang and Jon Halliday in 
books 67 years apart. Snow presented Mao autobiographically. In se-
lecting from his notes of the interview made in Bao'an, Snow allowed 
Mao to link his personal vicissitudes to his political awakening and the 
shaping of his radical ideas, to his views of history and the progressive 
nature of the Chinese revolution. In Snow's commentary what emerges 
is a picture of an exceptional intellectual-revolutionary whose 'Chinese' 
Marxism was a dialectic with history tempered by a strong sense of 
practical realism, and a pragmatic view of strategy and tactics. In what 
became a prophetic comment, Snow concludes the main part of this 
'autobiography' by saying that Mao's account 
had begun to pass out of the category of 'personal history', and to sublimate 
itself somehow intangibly in the career of a great movement in which, though 
he retained a dominant role, you could not see him clearly as a personality. It 
was no longer the 'I' but the 'we'; no longer Mao Tse-tung, but the Red Army; 
no longer a subjective impression of the experiences of a single life, but an 
objective record by a bystander concerned with the mutations of collective 
human destiny as the material of history. (Snow 1984: 166)
To Chang and Halliday, looking back on virtually the whole period of 
communist rule in China, this is so much nonsense. In their look at the 
'objective record', the real Mao, that is the historical actor, was little more 
than a tyrant and killer whose main attribute was to be more ruthless 
than anyone else. The 'personality' of Mao in Mao, the Unknown Story 
(Chang and Halliday 2005) was simply such a passion for the exercise 
of total power that he became responsible for 'mutations of collective 
human destiny' of a kind that resulted in millions of deaths. From such 
a perspective, to look back on Mao is to recognize that it is death itself 
that becomes the 'material of history'. 
So vast are the discrepancies between the two interpretations, between 
Snow's and Chang and Halliday's, between the human and the inhuman 
Mao, that they invite general speculation about the deﬁning power of 
power itself on personality. One might well ask whether Chang and Hal-
liday's revisionism represents an example of warranted or unwarranted 
presentism.1 Certainly it would wipe out the earlier consideration, that 
of an original evolving, learning, philosophical, thinker/doer obsessed 
with continuing revolution as both theory and practice. Instead of a 
ﬁtting addition to the Marxian pantheon, one ﬁnds a blemished 'Mao', 
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condemned from the start by an original sin of ruthless ambition, whose 
madness did not prevent him from shrewdly playing a game of pure 
power in the name of China's revolution. 
There is no deﬁnitive way to resolve such divergences. Nor is it the 
intention here to try to balance such widely differing accounts. But there 
are reasons why it is useful to reconsider the early revolutionary Mao in 
the context of his original circumstances, especially from the standpoint 
of those outsiders who were sufﬁciently dedicated to Mao and his role 
that they contributed to what, from Chang and Halliday's perspective, 
was the myth of Mao—a myth that their book tries to puncture. Yet it 
is precisely this mythic factor that helps account for the very power 
Mao exercised, especially in bringing about the structural alterations 
in character of the revolution itself, as the party evolved, ﬁrst in the 
emergence of Mao's own fraction (by no means the major one) into a 
virtual cult, and from there the elevation of Mao's version of Chinese 
Marxism into nothing less than a secular state religion. 
In these terms it is useful to examine the special role in making and 
interpreting history of those select few among the outsiders whose writ-
ings became particularly inﬂuential in their time and who, by themselves 
serving as witnesses, became part of the situation as well as commentators 
on it. One might say that they became, to use Durkheim's terms, social 
facts. For not only did they describe the events that they saw in deﬁnitive 
ways but they also included themselves in what they described.2 
In good measure those selected here for discussion were those who 
apparently came to believe in the rightness of the Chinese revolution as 
Mao's revolution. Convinced by the dramatic events they saw unfolding 
under their reportorial noses, they considered the Chinese communist 
revolution not simply as a remarkable phenomenon, but in some yet 
undisclosed form a possible political future solution, and more hope-
fully even some sort of democracy, especially since the readily available 
alternatives appeared unappetizing, namely fascism in Italy, Germany 
and Japan (not to speak of the 'proto-fascism' within the Guomindang 
(GMD)). Nor were they happy about the way capitalism played itself 
out, prone to both imperialism and internal crises, especially during 
the period which, if it was revolutionary in China, was marked by the 
Great Depression in the United States. 
In this context the role of Mao and the evolution of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) under Mao seemed more than a remarkable 
phenomenon. It became for the witnesses a way of understanding the 
power of Maoism in more universal terms, i.e. as a belief system. This 
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accounts for the more general concern in this discussion, a considera-
tion of Maoism as a proto-religious phenomenon. I want to examine 
this aspect of Maoism for two reasons. Firstly, it tends to be forgotten 
in the context of the China of today. This is unfortunate since, despite 
China's astonishing economic performance, it would lead us to ignore 
a certain remaining moral nostalgia for Maoism (which invites specula-
tion about the possibility that in some refurbished form it could revive 
in the future). The second reason is that insofar as not only Maoism but 
also virtually all forms of serious socialism have disappeared, so too has 
their religious dimension. This leaves a space for religious revivalism 
of all sorts, not least of all various fundamentalisms, evangelical beliefs 
and the separatist nationalism that can accompany these. 
I shall approach these larger matters by considering the views of 
several of the outsiders who were most important in framing, contex-
tualizing and communicating the elements of this proto-religion, and 
most particular the Americans who became complicit in what I consider 
to be the transcendent dimension of Maoism. It is also a way of seeing 
how powerful this aspect of Maoism was at the time. For not all of these 
witnesses were so easy to convince; nor were they ordinary journalists. 
What they saw as facts on the ground led them to portray a Mao whose 
subsequent role virtually obliterated his early and more heroic phase. 
Indeed, it became ritually redeﬁned: a papal, monarchical ﬁgure so given 
to ﬁts and starts of ideas and reactions that in hindsight one tends to 
forget his claim to reveal truths not visible to most of his compatriots, 
whether on the left or the right. But there, at the right moment and in 
the right places, these witnesses not only saw a different Mao. They also 
validated Maoism itself as a form of redemptive power based on 'higher 
truths' that came to be self-validating, but without analysing the 'truths' 
in themselves. In this way they helped to establish the Mao mystique, 
especially in the early period, in Yan'an. 
What impressed them most was less a matter of a Chinese variant 
of Marxism-Leninism than a sense of community spirit and collective 
agency. There was for them no particular apotheosis but rather a real 
Road to Damascus, and with it a sense of participating in a historical, 
moral moment. This was a moment when Mao's monopolistic truth 
claims seemed utterly plausible to them and commonplace knowledge 
seemed wrong—a space in which such truth claims were located and 
within which Maoism became both a social and political teleology, a 
doctrine of the exceptional source.3 In this regard I wish to show that one 
can consider the later Mao portrayed by Chang and Halliday as a case of 
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Weberian political routinization of charisma, in which political violence 
becomes ritualized as a structural factor in the organization of power. 
Journalists as Witnesses 
That commentators can serve as witnesses is of course an old story. The 
literary reshaping of public understanding has an antique and classic 
pedigree. However, for professional journalists to serve in this role is 
relatively modern. Journalists are in this sense Johnny-come-latelies 
whose appearance is roughly coincident with the emergence of a popu-
lar press and the spread of literacy, as Benedict Anderson and others 
have pointed out (Anderson 1991). Putting the tools of the journalistic 
trade to such purposes may be said to have properly begun in the pe-
riod just prior to the great democratic revolutions—British, French and 
American—when as on-the-spot observers, journalists became engaged 
in the ideological disputes of the time. The best of them were willing 
to take on the great debates, trade-offs between liberty and equality as 
well as ways to make power accountable and responsible, i.e. debates 
over the nature of democracy itself. In doing so they were often reviled 
and excoriated. Nevertheless they served as privileged witnesses to the 
events themselves. 
The most successful of the journalists-cum-witnesses were those 
who could supply gripping eyewitness accounts of what they saw and 
from which they drew preferred inferences. They combined shrewd 
observations with if not comprehensive than comprehensible descrip-
tions. Indeed, such an ability became the trademark of high journalism 
as distinct from mere reportage, the distinguishing mark of the serious 
journalist rather than the journalistic hack. This gave the former an 
aura, as Benjamin called it, a truth credential and well as a claim to right 
of access to the movers and shakers of the events themselves. In any 
case, by the time the major communist and nationalist revolutions of 
the last century occurred, such professional high journalism had long 
been established. 
However, while revolutions might attract large numbers of reporters 
interested in the events for themselves, it was only the privileged few 
whose reportage achieved interpretive authority. Moreover, in the na-
ture of the case, at any rate vis-à-vis the Russian and Chinese revolutions, 
interpretation meant contextualization, including exposing to public 
view the machinations of those in high places whose views they consid-
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ered blind and reactionary, not to speak of the role of special interests 
and corrupt politicians.4 In this sense these journalists-cum-witnesses 
acted as muck-rakers, missionaries and, above all, as interpreters. That 
is, they assigned to themselves the job of translating alien cultures into 
readily comprehensible understanding based on long sojourns rather 
than short visits. It is also the case that in general their analyses were 
quick, shrewd, intelligent and thin; that is, they lacked much intellec-
tual depth. Not for them the dense distinctions of Marxist polemics and 
their philosophical underpinnings. Indeed, to become bogged down in 
such matters would have destroyed the ability of quick portrayal and 
the immediacy of descriptive impact. 
In addition, remaining aloof from such matters went along with their 
notions of being independent-minded. These witnesses refused to be 
intimidated either by conventional views or by sectarian preferences. 
They regarded their observations as objective—a notion of objectivity 
that included partisanship as a means of rectifying widespread and 
prevailing distortions of fact and interpretation. In describing China 
as a place where justice had gone awry, theirs was also an appeal to a 
sense of fair play, in which objectivity required a rectifying partisan-
ship, while bringing the two together was a badge of personal honour 
and professional pride.
If the persuasiveness of their arguments had signiﬁcant effects on 
home consumption by making them stand out as opinion makers, they 
were also able to exercise some inﬂuence on governments and at times 
to serve as intermediaries between the existing powers and those trying 
to replace them. The latter was a role that could engender suspicion from 
both sides, which gave them an added incentive to protect themselves 
from charges of bias or inaccuracy or the dishonest exercise of their 
calling. They claimed the reliability of their facts. And they believed 
that in some ﬁnal sense it was the terms of those facts that rendered it 
appropriate for them to address truth to power.5 
The immediate journalistic predecessors and peers of these witnesses 
were those who had reported on the Russian revolution and its after-
math, including such ﬁgures as Walter Duranty of the New York Times 
(a Pulitzer Prize winner), Arthur Ransome of the Manchester Guardian, 
Albert Rhys Williams and Eugene Lyons, to name only a few. If not 
mentors, they were part of a larger radical pool which in terms of the 
Chinese revolution became identiﬁed in particular with Agnes Smedley, 
Anna Louise Strong and Edgar Snow. 6
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It should be clear that my present interest in these writers is not so 
much for their speciﬁc views or even their accounts of events, fascinat-
ing as these are. Rather my interest lies in the way their private access 
to Mao enabled them to give him a deﬁning public stamp. Such private 
access was in effect their journalistic capital. And since it was a rare good 
and a scarce commodity, it was one they zealously guarded. It consti-
tuted a form of privilege that made them a part of the pantheon they 
themselves were describing.  Evidence for such speculations is based 
on a rereading of their very abundant writings as well as accounts and 
comments of those who knew them in one capacity or another. In my 
case an interview with Harrison Salisbury led to an introduction to Helen 
Snow at her home in Connecticut.7 Although ill, she was nevertheless 
extremely voluble and appeared to be as committed ever to the China 
she knew in the old days.8 An interview with John Service led to Israel 
Epstein, whom I interviewed several times (in his rooms at the Friend-
ship Hotel in Beijing). I was able to come to know such ﬁgures as Rewi 
Alley, Sol Adler and others who had thrown in their lot with China.9 
Still later I came to know Edgar Snow's second wife, Lois Wheeler Snow. 
I interviewed many others who knew Strong and Smedley. 
I select these three—Snow, Strong and Smedley—for discussion for 
several reasons. All three have been canonized in China, not least of all 
in terms of the 'Three S Society' whose president, Huang Hua, became 
foreign minister of China, but who in a previous incarnation was Snow's 
original interpreter in Yan'an (and whom I was able to interview in 
1986).10 It is also the case that each of these 'witnesses' to Mao's revolution 
has been written up in extremely useful biographies (Hamilton 1988; 
Strong 1983; MacKinnon 1988). In addition to their books and articles, 
there are abundant archival materials. However, if we concentrate on 
these three it should be kept in mind that they were only a part, albeit 
a very signiﬁcant part, of a much larger circle of foreigners favourable 
to the Chinese communist revolution, many of whom were their friends 
and associates. 
Since the three have been written about on many occasions, there 
is little need in this discussion to go into details about their lives and 
works. They represented only a fraction of a much larger and very 
diverse group of reporters and commentators who began arriving in 
China in the immediate aftermath of the First World War to ﬁnd plenty 
of political ferment. 
The May 4th movement inspired a whole generation of young Chinese 
intellectuals to engage in political activism, and there was widespread 
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urban and labour unrest. The inheritance of Sun Yat-sen, which for a 
time had seemed capable of providing within the GMD a framework that 
could embrace both the nationalists and the communists, had become 
the provenance for internecine conﬂict. So much so that willy-nilly in 
order to do their jobs in more than a perfunctory way, journalists had 
to choose sides. As factional disputes intensiﬁed, partisans on the left 
saw Chiang Kai-shek becoming more and more proto-fascist while the 
Maoist version of communism with its agrarian communalism seemed 
by far the more promising alternative and a radical departure from 
Stalinism. As the GMD Northern Campaign to eliminate warlords 
was succeeded by extermination campaigns against the communists, 
the hinge or deﬁning event became the now famous Long March—the 
ultimate dramatistic accomplishment (and which in Chang and Halli-
day's reinterpretation was nothing of the sort since they were allowed 
to escape by the GMD). 
Smedley, Strong and Snow and their friends and associates saw this 
event as a more or less miraculous event, one that recast the Chinese 
communists not as a band of bandits but as heroic survivors who, when 
they ﬁnally holed up in caves in Yan'an, founded the New Jerusalem 
of the Chinese revolution. Mao became something of a Robin Hood 
with brains, his writings serving as critical guides to military and 
civic action. Moreover his emphasis on the peasantry as a class with 
revolutionary chains had a romantic resonance with an earlier Ameri-
can heritage. Mao himself could be recast as someone reminiscent of 
populist agrarian reformers in the United States. But he was also a 
self-made intellectual carrying forward the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist 
pedigree on his own terms.
As to the events Smedley, Strong and Snow witnessed, they were 
intrinsically dramatic enough, both in their details and in the round. To 
pursue them as facts and turn them into stories and narratives requires in 
the ﬁrst instance great physical personal courage not to speak of endur-
ance. All three witnesses were tough, restless and always on the move. 
They were continually on the look-out for the interesting personality, the 
tragic hero, and made such people metonymic for the larger principles 
of the revolution. By the same token they were romantic realists living 
for radical adventure, their accounts all the more gripping for including 
themselves. All were good writers. 
Smedley, a self-made woman born to poverty in the West who had ab-
sorbed populist radicalism from the start, described incidents of murder 
she had witnessed ﬁrst-hand, not to speak of assassination, torture and 
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rape. China for her had abandoned all pretence of decency. Its political 
and social institutions had become totally corrupt. She was appalled 
at the general indifference to the cruelty and brutality of ordinary life, 
where death and torture had become banal and ordinary. And she was 
mesmerized not only by Mao himself but the Chinese communist top 
leadership, some of whom she came to know intimately. While she 
wrote as a professional journalist, she had come of age as a radical in 
the context of the Indian struggle against British imperialism and in 
the particular context of Indian exiles in Germany. As a result of this 
experience, she became what she remained: a professional revolution-
ary writing largely for German and American newspapers. Although 
for a time China correspondent for the Manchester Guardian, to her great 
frustration she couldn't get a word in edgewise at the Daily Worker. 
Anna Louise Strong's Letters From China were widely read in the 
United States and England and were said to have inﬂuenced Eleanor 
Roosevelt and other highly placed ﬁgures. Her articles and books were 
disseminated widely in the American press. She was the most intellectual 
of the three, with a doctorate from the University of Chicago. Her roots 
were in New England Congregationalism. As she became involved in 
social work in the United States, she moved more and more to the left, 
coming to know the more Bohemian left in New York as well as com-
munists. She, perhaps more than the others, was most ﬁrmly convinced 
of the doctrinal rightness of communism. 
But it was Edgar Snow who gave his stamp and imprimatur to the 
Chinese communists ﬁrst in Bao'an, where he ﬁrst interviewed Mao, 
and then in Yan'an. He wrote regularly for the Saturday Evening Post. 
Perhaps no single book was more inﬂuential in China as well as the 
United States than his Red Star over China (ﬁrst published 1937), which 
remains something of a landmark even to this day with its unforget-
table portrayal of Mao. 
If Smedley was ﬂamboyant and Strong demanding, Snow remained 
the 'man from Missouri', who kept a certain distance while never pre-
tending to be an indifferent observer. By presenting the 'Reds' in a benign 
way, he countered the prevailing view of them as bandits. All three writ-
ers remained admirers of Mao to the end of their lives. Smedley died in 
1950 and so did not have to confront the twists and turns of the party 
line that began with the Great Leap and the anti-rightist campaigns. The 
other two did come to have reservations about the intemperateness of 
the Cultural Revolution, particularly Snow, who in his obituary of Mao 
comments that the leader
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could simultaneously hold in mind contradictory concepts of time and space, 
of strategy, of right and wrong; he could act out decisions into realities as 
if they were the only truth, knowing all the while that the opposite was an 
essential part of it. (Cited in Hamilton 1988: 285) 
Throughout the 1930s each of them opened a somewhat different 
window to the radical side of Chinese politics. Their views encouraged 
young Chinese to join the Chinese communists rather than the Guomin-
dang. Their opinions on Mao's communism were voiced in redeeming 
terms: a relatively open community, locally democratic, honest and 
egalitarian—in short, everything that China was not. As indicated, they 
remained aloof from the intricacies of Mao's texts and the exegetical de-
tails of wording and meaning that became so much a part of the politics 
of theory and the theory of politics and, above all, Mao's rationale for 
action. They preferred the high road in every sense, that is, they were 
longer on heroics than the ins and outs of ideas other than in the most 
limited way.11 They combined in their narratives a very American view 
of politics as a struggle for morality, the good versus the evil and as a 
result captivated a quite considerable readership.
They also rubbed shoulders with some of those who had come to 
China on ofﬁcial missions and who became attracted to what they saw 
going on Yan'an in sharp contrast to the rest of China. That wider circle of 
witnesses included clerics, like the so-called 'pink' Bishop Logan Roots, 
a few members of the American military like Colonel Evans Carlson (of 
Carlson's Raiders fame), and General Joseph Stilwell.12 Other journalists 
included Israel Epstein, who was a correspondent for the United Press 
and Harrison Salisbury for the New York Times.13 And there those who 
chose to cast their lot with the Chinese communists in working for them, 
some well before and some after the communists came to power, such 
as Rewi Alley in the ﬁrst instance and Sol Adler in the second. 
What then drew these people to each other? While each had his or her 
own reasons for going to China, all saw the revolution as a fundamental 
break, a disjunctive moment, one that deﬁned a 'before' and an 'after'. 
'Before' was all nasty, brutish and short, while the 'after' remained a 
promised land. For them Yan'an embodied an ideal concretized in a 
practical revolutionary programme, one that seemed the only plausi-
ble solution to China's chaos and suffering. Whatever their particular 
views, they witnessed in Yan'an a community that through its mode 
of activity appeared to be capable of transforming what was negative 
into something socially and politically positive, evidence for the latter 
provided by the success of the social reforms practised by the commu-
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nists on a more or less daily basis. Above all, the transcendence of Mao 
seemed something of a miracle in its own right, not least of all by the 
circumstances of his origins. The Mao they came to know and admire 
was the agent of a higher revolutionary consciousness and not just a su-
perior political leader—in short a cosmocrat. One hesitates to use terms 
like idolatry; Mao's mystique was for them never that. But mystique he 
certainly had, although they toned this down in their accounts. 
In hindsight one can only speculate about how much they actually 
knew of what was going on despite their mastery of events and their 
extraordinary access to leaders and commanders at all levels. One can 
only speculate too, about what they were willing to hide or at least 
what they preferred not to see.14 However, it seems quite clear that 
the Mao they knew in his Yan'an heyday was not the same Mao they 
saw emerge after coming to power in 1949 and especially during the 
Cultural Revolution.15 
I have mentioned the seductive aspect of personal access to Mao and 
his immediate entourage. They regarded him as a mover and shaker 
of history in the fullest sense of the word, that is, in terms not only of 
China but of the future impact China would have on a worldwide scale. 
Such views only intensiﬁed the value of access to and intimacy with Mao 
himself. Conscious of their roles as witnesses to high historical drama, 
they saw the entire atmosphere, physical and well as moral and practi-
cal, in terms of narratives and theatre, of which they were a part. 
This sense of theatre is present even in Snow's original interview with 
Mao in Bao'an. His description is stage set and setting. Even the idea of 
audience took on the character of ritualistic journalistic pilgrimages. It 
was a special occasion to interview Mao, to hear his words, and not only 
to see but also to come to know the palpable living Mao face to face. 
Such access to Mao was more than a valuable journalistic privilege; it 
was entry into the sanctuary. 
Of course, this did not prevent the witnesses from taking advantage 
of their access in different ways: Smedley to promote feminism in an 
age when it was just beginning; Strong to clean up the unpleasant side 
of communism of which she herself had ample experience in the Soviet 
Union (not least when her Russian husband was purged); Snow in try-
ing to make sense for outsiders of what was going on in China outside 
of the conventionally held views. Each in exposing different aspects of 
conditions in China nevertheless shared a common and ﬁrmly held con-
clusion: Mao's version of communist revolution was not like any other 
version and it was historically necessary. They also tried to make their 
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accounts and conclusions palatable to publishers and the public at large. 
Hence the claims that their views were not ideological but assertions 
of fact over opinion. They portrayed themselves as individualists if not 
'characters', recognizable within the tradition of forthright independent 
journalism in the classic American mode.16 All had authentic American 
pedigrees.17 But all retained a special affection for Mao himself. For 
Strong, this was explicit: 'I came because Mao in Yan'an invited me to 
return and because ever since I met him I felt that the answer to the 
world's revolution was here.'18 
Despite such convictions, and in the case of Strong, residency in China, 
both Smedley and Strong retained a certain nostalgia for the United 
States. If the latter remained constant to communism, underlying her 
devotion was principled action—to enable good works from a radical 
missionary position.19 Each believed that his or her own dissent from 
mainstream views represented an obligation to the Chinese people (for 
Smedley, the Chinese 'masses'). All three at times marched with the Red 
Army. They provided medical care for the wounded. They gave money 
to help individuals on the ground. That active service component of 
their commitments was key to the access they obtained. Yet despite 
such commitments, which on the whole were quite open, they were 
able to a surprising extent to maintain links with diplomatic circles and 
ambassadorial contacts. 
Smedley and Strong came to the Russian and Chinese revolutions 
as rebels who had already discovered causes. Edgar Snow had fewer 
predispositions. But he moved in circles where nationalism, socialism, 
anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism were the ordinary subjects of in-
tense debate among those who deﬁned themselves and each other ac-
cording to which symbols of communism they preferred—Lenin, Stalin 
or Mao—(and more occasionally Trotsky) and how they felt about their 
corresponding lines, fractions and ideologies. If there was a previously 
deﬁning event for them all it was the Spanish Civil War. But as well each 
stood for a more general set of conditions of possibility—dictatorship or 
democracy; private property or public; freedom rather than coercion. 
Anna Louise Strong, more than the others, viewed the Chinese com-
munists as a modern version of a pervasively American kind of Christian 
millenniarism stripped of its clericalism. Agnes Smedley saw in revo-
lution the best way to shake up inequities of all kinds, those produced 
by imperialism, sexual and gender inequality—revolution as a thing in 
itself. Edgar Snow saw the revolution as a reaping of the whirlwind given 
the suffering, corruption and cruelties that prevailed. All believed that 
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conditions in China were the result of imperialism, foreign and domestic, 
the most raw form of compradore capitalism, or to use Mao's words, 'the 
patriarchal class of local tyrants, evil gentry and lawless landlords [that] 
has formed the basis of autocratic government for thousands of years and 
is the cornerstone of imperialism, warlordism, and corrupt ofﬁcialdom.' 
In a subsequent generation they would be followed by those who were 
not only true believers but cultists, some of whom, knowing nothing of 
China, would be mesmerized by the Cultural Revolution.20 
For Strong and Snow as well as a good many others the Cultural Revo-
lution occurred towards the end of their lives as working journalists. It 
gave rise to reservations about Mao that coincided with the decline of 
their own inﬂuence in the United States. During the McCarthy period 
they were branded as traitors. But something of the faith remained until 
the end. Smedley, who had died much earlier in England, had estab-
lished something of a precedent when her ashes were taken to China 
and buried in the Cemetery for Revolutionary Martyrs. When Strong 
died in China, her funeral was attended by Zhou Enlai, a large black 
banner displaying the words, 'May Anna Louise Strong Live Forever in 
Our Memories'. She too was buried in the Cemetery for Revolutionary 
Martyrs. Snow, in self-imposed exile in Switzerland, was able before he 
died to intervene in public affairs in an extraordinary way. He played 
a crucial role in arranging President Nixon's visit to China (Hamilton 
1988: 280).21 His ashes were divided between a site overlooking the 
Hudson River and the Lake That Has No Name on the campus of Pe-
king University.
As witnesses to revolutionary events, these commentators supplied 
their own testimony and provided authenticity to belief and credibility 
to preferred truths. They expressed those truths as outrage—outrage 
at conditions as they saw them in China, outrage at the violence and 
corruption of the GMD, and outrage at American support for it. In de-
ﬁning in a public and visible way what was wrong, and not only wrong 
but morally wrong, and describing in concrete ways the suffering this 
imposed upon ordinary people, they deﬁned what can be called a nega-
tive pole in which Maoism became the overcoming project. What they 
saw as witnesses became a form of testimony, in which they offered 
themselves as evidence for the evidence. Such political audacity was 
always a dangerous game. They were in one sense incorporated in the 
Chinese communist movement; so much so that their lives remained 
intertwined with the triumphs and vicissitudes of Mao, even when his 
activities and the turbulence it set off troubled them.  
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Yan'an and the Religious Moment  
in Revolutionary Politics 
The extent to which the witnesses contributed to the transformation of 
Maoism into a radical sect within Chinese Marxism should not, of course, 
be overstated. Their roles were in no sense decisive. What happened in 
China followed its own dynamics. Nevertheless, in describing Mao's 
role in reshaping the Chinese Communist Party, and the actual events 
of war and revolution, the picture they portrayed was to some extent a 
picture invented by Mao himself. In doing so he placed himself at the 
political centre of the party, within the territorial space of Yan'an as a 
simulacrum for China as a whole—a miniaturization of a redemptive 
redoubt, civil and military, in which teaching and preaching combined 
in hortatory texts. The themes were explicitly moral in terms of millen-
nial Marxist solutions, nationalist in terms of transcending redemptive 
and libertarian themes, plus the high drama of violence, heroic acts, the 
individual overcoming the self by reaching to a collective apotheosis. 
These comments should not be misunderstood. Even though one 
ought not equate religion and politics, they have at times certain pro-
pinquities if not properties in common. On this there is a huge litera-
ture, more of it dealing with religion as politics rather than politics as 
religion. Among the characteristic properties of the latter is the deiﬁca-
tion of political leaders who demand obeisance and command respect: 
charismatics who can take many roles and play many parts whether 
monarchical, priestly, military or civil. What they have in common is a 
set of omnipotent beliefs, revelatory or theoretical, which are extensions 
of their own special patrimony. Such beliefs have political consequences, 
whether secular or sacred in origin, including the mobilization of clien-
teles, claims to sacred territorial space, privileged afﬁliations, cultural 
identities, loyalties and commitments (Cohn 1961; Callois 1959). In this 
sense such ﬁgures play larger-than-life roles in history. 
In this more general sense, too, few would doubt that Marxism in 
several of its putative forms shares similarities with religion tout court, 
even and perhaps because it is explicitly anti-religious. On this score 
there is plenty of evidence about the religious properties of commu-
nism. As one former devotee, Arthur Koestler, put it with respect to 
the Soviet Union:
Russia was merely the new occasion for the revival of an archetype as old 
as humanity. Like its past symbols, the Golden Age, the Land of Promise 
and the Kingdom of Heaven, it offered glorious compensation for a life of 
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frustration and the pointlessness of death. Those of us who have lived in the 
communist movement know how completely the Soviet myth fulﬁlled this 
function—not for the Russians but for the worshippers outside. (Koestler 
1945: 125) 
Or as Sheila Fitzpatrick put it:
Like freemasons, communists had many rituals. Their status as communists 
was related to their mastery of esoteric language. They were brothers 
and their brotherhood was in some sense secret. They had symbols they 
cherished, like the Red Flag, and a history, including a martyrology, that 
every communist had to know. They had a body of sacred texts … (Fitzpatrick 
1999: 19) 
The witnesses in their writings and dispatches gave substance to this 
larger frame. The experiences they chose to describe matched Mao's 
own discourse not in form but in descriptive characterization such as 
themes of descent: how far the Chinese people had fallen and thereby 
come to inhabit a kind of nether world, a virtual hell on earth. These 
themes set the stage for their opposites, themes of accomplishment, mi-
raculous military victories and social triumphs. Yan'an was the special 
metaphor, the living version of an idealized community, a microcosmic 
salvational universe which gave a virtual superhuman dimension to 
what Mao was able to achieve against overwhelming odds, providing 
testimony to the rightness of his logic and the correctness of his vision 
(Frye 1976: 97-126). 
In this sense they served, and willingly, to deﬁne the Chinese revo-
lution as a combination of founding and transformation, the birth of a 
new society based on a total and totalizing revelatory metamorphosis. 
This morally redemptive transformation would change the attitudes 
and commitments of the Chinese from a passive acquiescence in things 
as they were, an acceptance of chaos as a normal condition, to commit-
ment and self-sacriﬁce for the common good. The witnesses lent their 
aura to Mao's deﬁnition of the revolution as a truly historical disjunc-
tive moment rather than a civil war and national response to Japanese 
aggression. 
In this sense also the witnesses gave a certain universality to the events 
happening in China. Their writings suggested that all such movements 
require certain conditions if revolutionary actions are to be successful 
by means of mass mobilizing organization. A negative pole is needed 
in order to deﬁne the transcending accomplishment, the projective 
outcome. That pole represents that period of revolutionary latency, 
that condition of chaos, of generalized risk, that opens the way for the 
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kinds of disjunctive moments described, and invites authority. The 
intermingling themes and contexts included those relevant elsewhere: 
the founding of new nations, the transformation of old ones, and the 
redemptive recuperation of those gone astray. All require the mobili-
zation of transformational energies as a way to accomplish both goals. 
For the witnesses the way the Chinese communists accomplished that 
mobilization of energies, individual and collective, represented the nec-
essary if not the sufﬁcient Promethean conditions, to achieve something 
akin to a political Promised Land. In this they helped to construct what 
can only be called the mythic dimension of Maoism.
It is in these terms that classic Maoism shared many of the attributes 
of religion. It was also a product of Mao's cosmocratic capacities as Chief 
Agent requiring absolute obedience to his monopolistic claims of truth. 
Other views were not dissent but heresy, a common feature of religions 
generally and politics more particularly, especially when different fac-
tions claim competing orthodoxies, with each trying to capitalize on 
any loose estrangements by followers of the others. In the Chinese case, 
dissent over doctrines within the CPP intensiﬁed internal conﬂict and 
sect division in the very act of demanding total unity and a common 
front against common enemies. 22
I have elsewhere argued that Yan'an was a discourse community with 
something of a Chosen People quality. In present terms the Yan'anites 
represented a semi-religious community complete with its own biblical 
texts, its glossators and commentators, its ofﬁcial interpreters and its 
ascetics—asceticism being a requirement of being a 'good communist'. 
This deﬁned the 'inside' which contrasted with the 'outside' in China as 
a whole. Not only could nothing in the rest of China compare with the 
disciplined social life of Yan'an, but in this rugged terrain one found 
the cultivation of the arts, theatre, culture and education. Its rigorous 
morals gave an appearance of equality between men and women. As 
for struggles between elements of the party, facts on the ground seemed 
to vindicate Mao's line. So impressive were his accomplishments that 
it was difﬁcult not to come under the spell of Mao's vision, his ability 
to see past the limits of conventional wisdom, and to give events new 
meaning, if not turning facts into ﬁctions and ﬁctions into facts. 
The witnesses, then, accepted the events of struggle in terms of the 
logic he stood for without going into that logic in any detail. For them 
it appeared uncanny in its shrewdness. And if it seemed to spring from 
his own head, it also represented an extrapolation from the common 
experience (Apter and Saich 1994). In sum, the Mao they came to believe 
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in was the Mao who was a master at converting events into situations, 
and using such situations as the structural components of his texts and 
his interpretations of history. He knew which situations to identify and 
which among them would make people sit up and take notice. He was 
in these respects expert at establishing promontory situations in which 
defeats became victories: the Battle of Jinggang Mountains, the Nanchang 
Uprising, the Autumn Harvest Uprising, the Long March itself, the Battle 
of Luding Bridge, becoming like so many Stations of the Cross. These be-
came key events in a narrative that endowed Mao himself with symbolic 
signiﬁcance and provided a logic for millennial outcomes. It became the 
task of the witnesses to provide conﬁrmation, indeed apostolic testimony. 
All religions properly speaking have their equivalents. 
They believed too that Mao's authorizing sources derived not only 
from Marxism but included an earlier interest in anarchism, something 
particularly appealing to Smedley. But because Mao also drew on those 
with authorizing historical resonance, Confucianism and Taoism (with 
perhaps a touch of the Taiping leader Hong Xiuquan with his visions 
of God, and whose texts had to be learned by all) as well the grand and 
subversive transformations between dynasties, he drew on 'authentic' 
Chinese cultural traditions (Schram 1989: 141; Wakeman 1984). Mao 
was able to bring these down to earth and a straightforward version 
of dialectical knowledge, a logic of contradictions perhaps more than a 
true dialectic, and a notion of class struggle by means of which he stood 
orthodox Marxism on its head. The redemptive projects he deﬁned were 
grounded in the peasantry, making them the inversionary surrogates for 
revolutionary action and appealing to the weapon of transformational 
accomplishment. So, if the goal was inspirational, its authority dialecti-
cal, based on a reading of history as an evolution of inversionary stages, 
its consequences were entirely practical. The party was the chosen instru-
ment for a chosen people whose enlightenment principles constituted 
the moral and political centre according to Mao—principles that abjured 
liberalism and tolerance in the name of a higher Reason.23 
Mao carved discourses out of events, just as in Yan'an they carved 
caves out of the mountains. Not only were the witnesses fascinated by 
Mao close up, they also recognized a certain peasant shrewdness that 
linked him to and made him part of the rank and ﬁle. But they appreci-
ated too his more sophisticated, if stylized, knowledge of art, literature 
and calligraphy, which played well with the intellectuals in the move-
ment. They liked the way he could play several ranges within the same 
textual register, to make himself as much revolutionary commander as 
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teacher. They found his style as well as his virtuosity endearing. For 
them Mao was their folk hero of socialist modernity, his self recruited 
elect an 'Onward Communist Soldiers' equivalent of the missionaries of 
an earlier day. Reason replaced simple belief (or so it seemed), within a 
movement-militant instead of a church-militant. Although they would 
have most emphatically disavowed such a comparison, one could argue 
that at the very least during the Yan'an days, the witnesses saw in Mao 
something more than an exceptional reformer, or even a prototypical 
revolution. They recognized a ﬁgure vaguely reminiscent of a primitive 
Jesus, not only a man of the people able to perform battleﬁeld miracles 
but also a man of organization and ideas, someone of whom it could 
be said that 
he regarded himself as the universal reformer. The heavens, the earth, the 
whole of nature, madness, disease, and death, were but his instruments. In 
his paroxysm of heroic will, he believed himself all powerful. (Renan 1927: 
151-52) 
The quote, ironically enough, is from Renan's Life of Jesus. If this 
seems far-fetched, all one needs to do is go back to Edgar Snow's de-
scription of Mao. He portrays him as a man of the people, a man of 
sorrows acquainted with grief, a cosmocratic agent expressing doctrinal 
moral truths. Renan's purpose was to examine the real rather than the 
apocryphal aspects of a ﬁgure whose hortatory preachings were real-
ized in a mystical community, exegetically bonded, and representing a 
redemptive and redeeming project. And if the Apostles described the 
magic of the events, their writings constituting biblical texts, the Gospels 
giving rise to hermeneutic endeavour, truths pored over intently by 
a priesthood capable of establishing both a method of moral persua-
sion and an insight into privileged truths, so too with Mao's texts and 
their interpreters—the whole reinforced in Rectiﬁcation Campaigns 
that served to both endorse and punitively enforce Mao's exceptional 
revelatory insight.24 
Not only did the accounts of the witnesses contribute to such myth 
making but also in their narratives, as in Mao's, it was the Mao himself 
who became the central authorizing ﬁgure, the knowing prophet to 
whose original thoughts the witnesses offered testimony and context, 
and by so doing privileged his role. If what Renan described could 
apply more generally to saints or prophets, popes and bishops, fetish 
priests and shamans, mullahs and monks, and not least of all to politi-
cal philosophers and their doctrines, one could also argue that the real 
Mao was a bit of all these.
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Insofar as Yan'an represented a revolutionary moment, another of 
Renan's comments also applies: 
'Our civilizations, governed by minute restrictions, cannot give us any idea 
of the power of man at periods in which the originality of each one had a 
freer ﬁeld wherein to develop itself'. (Schram 1989)
The Yan'an that the journalists saw was one of those periods. It was 
an opening, one with not only siniﬁed characteristics of Marxism but in 
the eyes particularly of Smedley, Snow and Strong, a moment that paral-
leled the early Christian communities. Like them, the constituency was 
of the poor. Like them followers were persecuted for the revolutionary 
content of their beliefs and principles. And like them, the revelatory was 
connected to the instrumental. Revolution was the necessary disjunctive 
accomplishment—not any disjunction but a revolutionary break with 
previous beliefs and institutions. 
The witnesses also realized that such historical moments are rare and 
that when they occur it includes personalized expressions of power—po-
litical agents purporting to totalizing salvational solutions. Insofar as 
agency is crucial, so the return of the exiled Mao, this time to power in 
the party, made him the epicentre of a Rome towards which all roads 
would lead, not only on the ground but in more general ways—symbolic, 
institutional, communicative and instrumental (Ricoeur 1986: 235).
Perhaps in retrospect it is better to describe the beliefs of the witnesses 
as a 'now you see it now you don't' phenomenon. Certainly our wit-
nesses attributed Mao's power to the effectiveness of his appeal to the 
deprived, marginalized, vulnerable peasants who appeared to possess 
the best revolutionary potential as surrogates for Mao's hortatory last-
shall-be-ﬁrst, world-turned-upside-down, master-and-slave doctrines. 
They found themselves in a position that would later ﬁnd resonance in 
nationalist and social protest movements, revolutionary and redemp-
tive in nature (Apter 1963). Nevertheless, just as a church is a venue 
for ordinary social occasions, the human intimate side of doctrinal 
orthodoxy, so for them Yan'an remained something of a church in that 
sense, and on a human scale, as was Mao himself. In this regard there 
was something deliberately endearing about the way both Smedley and 
Strong liked to recount how they taught Mao to dance and how dancing 
become a regular event at least for the highest cadres. 
The religious aspects of politics also create the conditions and char-
acteristics of high drama with recounted events as dramatic episodes. 
Snow in particular was sensitive to the drama associated with Mao's 
role. Just before recounting his interview with Mao in Red Star over 
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China, he discusses the importance of 'red theatre', linking it to a larger 
radical inheritance, including the revolutionary theatre of the Soviet 
Union. As already suggested, Snow's portrayal of Mao is itself theatri-
cal. His interview begins with a descriptive stage setting. He and Mao 
are huddled in a cave lit by sputtering candles. Mao speaks in a 'soft 
southern dialect' of his origins in a poor peasant family, the strictness 
of his father, his love of Chinese classics, his going to work at the age 
of 13, his apprenticeship, his return to school in ragged clothes, his 
awakening to radical thought, and later, his internal exile by the party 
to Hun'an, where he found inspiration among the peasant poor. Snow's 
account shows a Mao whose personal fortunes became an overcoming 
project, overcoming ignorance, poor social conditions, the contempt of 
intellectuals, etc. for China. The story as he told it is by now well known 
(Saich 1996; Rue 1966). 
What the witnesses above all tried to portray was a Mao whose rise 
to power was not only a matter of skilful maneouvring but also an ex-
ample of virtue triumphant. In this they provided a rendered offering, 
virtually a biblical tale. And while 
[t]here would never be any one 'savior' of China, yet undeniably one felt a 
certain force of destiny in Mao. It was nothing quick or ﬂashy, but a kind 
of solid elemental vitality. One felt that whatever there was extraordinary 
in this man grew out of the uncanny degree to which he synthesized and 
expressed the urgent demands of millions of Chinese and especially the 
peasantry. (Snow 1984: 66) 
It should be noted that of the three, Edgar Snow always kept some-
thing of himself in reserve.25
What the witnesses saw with considerable clarity was that Mao's 
exceptionalism was due not least to an uncanny ability to combine a 
life intertwined with action, not to speak of violence, with symbolic 
and logical nuance. 
Unless social life has a symbolic structure, there is no way to understand 
how we live, do things, and project these activities in ideas, no way to 
understand how reality can become an idea or how real life can produce 
illusions; these would all be simply mystical and incomprehensible events. 
(Ricoeur 1986: 8) 
Such symbolic structures realized in the acts of individuals are what 
Snow describes in terms of individual experiences—how joining the 
revolution became something more than an ordinary rite of passage 
and more like a religious conversion, an induction into Mao's army of 
believing militants by means of which personal insight was achieved. 
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This made it possible to transcend the self by means of commitment to 
prescribed truths and beliefs, not in some intellectual way but biblically; 
that is, making them resonate throughout one's entire being. 
It was Mao's ability to analyze the experience common to his generation—
rather than the uniqueness of his own experience—plus his messianic belief 
in the correctness of his own generalizations of that experience, which 
distinguished him from compatriots who became his followers. (Snow 
1970: 165) 
It was in these terms that able journalists were able to persuade 
themselves that Mao's was a version of agrarian communism, and that 
Yan'an was socialism with a human face.26 
In sum, the witnesses made more credible those aspects of Maoism 
that share attributes of religion, including the cosmocratic capacities of 
its agents and the monopolistic claims of its truths, which deﬁne other 
views and beliefs less as dissent and more as heresy. This last is par-
ticularly important, especially when different factions claim competing 
orthodoxies, each trying to capitalize on any loose estrangements by 
followers of the others. 
The Cultural Revolution  
and the End of Any Existing Socialism
In these terms one can say that Mao had not one but two periods of 
'ascendancy': the ﬁrst in Yan'an, especially during the years 1938-42 and 
subsequently the Cultural Revolution, the latter both farce and tragedy. 
If the two events are hardly comparable, Snow and Strong, not to speak 
of other witnesses, certainly did compare them, and at ﬁrst with sym-
pathy both for Mao's effort to regain power and also because they took 
a dim view of the economistic turn the Chinese government had come 
to favour. For example, in Red China Today Snow wrote that 
Mao was personally revered by most of the peasants of China and had 
gone far toward winning the younger people to his banner; the Cultural 
Revolution had, in the people's eyes been necessary to prevent the formation 
of a corruptive (revisionist) elite; and Mao had behind him the loyalty of the 
armed forces sufﬁcient to handle the internal factors of disunity. Mao still 
held the 'mandate of heaven'.'
Snow goes on: 
It was instructive to note that whereas in Stalin's Russia such a power struggle 
could have been quickly decided by the liquidation of any comrades in 
26_______________________ The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 22•2005
David E. Apter _____________________________________________________________
opposition, that did not happen in China. Despite three years of a great purge, 
Liu Shao-ch'I alone was ofﬁcially named as a renegade and expelled from the 
Party by Mao's Central Committee … For the rest of the top revisionists there 
presumably remained some hope of rehabilitation. As in past rectiﬁcations 
efforts at reconciliation followed tension and struggle. 
And even more astonishing:
Whatever their genesis, the new organs of Chinese government were bound 
to uphold the Thought of Mao as a unifying faith. Once the Soviet Party had 
repudiated Stalinist ikons, the Chinese could no longer involve the authority 
of Moscow's infallibility. After 1953 even Liu Shao-ch'I could not but help 
glorify Mao as the personiﬁcation of revolutionary creativity, independence, 
national self esteem, and world prestige. Now, as throughout history, China 
put a unique Sinitic stamp upon an imported ideology which at ﬁrst had 
appeared, to many, as a kind of barbarian conquest. It was not by accident 
that the patriarchal Mao, depicted as the Red Sun, hailed his people from 
the Heavenly Peace Gate where the Son of Heaven presided for ages long 
predating Karl Marx. (Snow 1971: 35) 
For all that, the witnesses did begin to have doubts. The question is, 
what kind of doubts? The problem of evaluating their belief in these 
terms is, as I suggested at the start, due in part to very real differences 
between religion itself and its political version, with religion more able 
to remain self-sustaining and self-replenishing, while over time political 
religion becomes ritualized, empty and punitive. Eventually this was an 
aspect of the Cultural Revolution that Strong and Snow among others 
could not continue to ignore. 
For all their commitment, and despite their view of Mao as Redeemer, 
it was the practical side of collective action that most appealed to them. 
They were all very much in the 'learn by doing' tradition. They were 
believers in Maoism as a system that produced collective voluntarism, 
which on a day-to-day basis is what a good deal of religion is about. 
But eventually even they were increasingly disturbed by the way the 
Cultural Revolution converted the Mao they knew in Yan'an into a 
strange, alienating, indeed almost fantastic creature of virtually mythic 
proportions. In place of the Mao they knew, who they recognized had 
his limitations, they saw in his return to power a condition that detracted 
from that original shrewdness, tactical sense and timing that had brought 
him to power—qualities that had been much underestimated by his 
competitors within and outside the party, not least of all by the Soviet-
trained 'twenty-two Bolsheviks' to their inﬁnite regret. The witnesses 
also recognized that , in keeping with their own beliefs as opposed to 
the more philosophically inclined Marxists, Maoism was not a very 
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deep form of Marxism-Leninism, but because of that it was accessible 
to most people at some level. So, while Mao was a remarkable ﬁgure of 
enormous talents, he was neither a superman nor the all-seeing omnis-
cient ﬁgure he was portrayed to be in the Cultural Revolution (Schram 
1969: 171-222). 
Nevertheless, for a considerable period of time Strong and Snow 
publicly acquiesced. For them, like a good many others, the Cultural 
Revolution appeared to be necessary because Mao had lost power to 
those who would corrupt the revolution. Strong, by now a more or 
less acceptable relic, allowed herself to be inducted into a group of Red 
Guards and wore a Red Guard armband on her uniform, although she 
did express misgivings that things had gotten too much out of hand. 
Only very slowly, and well after the advent of the Cultural Revolution, 
did these witnesses and their associates begin to distance themselves 
from Mao. But it was with great reluctance and such views remained 
private. Publicly they were unwilling to admit that something was going 
terribly wrong. Worst of all they began to realize that the apotheosis of 
Mao could not have occurred without him wanting it. They saw in such 
idolatry a dangerous if not fatal attraction to political leaders in other 
countries trying to emulate and exploit an equivalent phenomenon: 
Nkrumah's pan-African second coming in Ghana had its little black 
book; the Peruvian revolution its little blue book; and even Colonel 
Quaddaﬁ had his little green book (Apter 1963). 
Nor could they see the renewal of Yan'an principles in the events 
of the Cultural Revolution as claimed by its protagonists. They were 
particularly disturbed that by elevating Mao to god-like proportions, 
he was becoming a larger-than-life caricature of himself—such levita-
tion resulting in a Mao ever more remote and inaccessible to the peo-
ple themselves.27 Snow wrote more explicitly of the new role of the 
'Chairman', the cult of personality and the 'immoderate gloriﬁcation' 
he witnessed: 
Giant portraits of him now hung in the streets, busts were in every chamber, 
his books and photographs were everywhere on display to the exclusion of 
others. In the four-hour revolutionary pageant of dance and song, The East 
is Red, Mao was the only hero … I saw a portrait copied from a photograph 
taken by myself in 1936, blown up to about thirty feet high. It gave me a 
mixed feeling of pride of craftsmanship and uneasy recollection of similar 
extravaganzas of worship of Joseph Stalin seen during wartime years in 
Russia. (Snow 1972: 68-69) 
One suspects that neither his misgivings nor his 'pride of craftsman-
ship' ended with the portrait.
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If Snow and Strong as well as others continued to be great believers in 
calling a spade a spade, they did this best when they were comfortable 
reporting what they saw. When what they saw became uncomfortable, 
they became confused and unsure of themselves. They wanted above 
all to maintain their faith in the fundamental rightness of the Chinese 
revolution. They pointed to its visible accomplishments and obscured 
its disasters. None would have favoured the China of today. They were 
anti-consumption if not anti-capitalist. They liked the ideas of commu-
nal farming, Indusco, the industrial cooperative, which Rewi Alley and 
Helen Snow had helped to establish in the early days. They preferred 
the intimacy Yan'an afforded. Indeed, what they wanted was nothing 
less than the small community in the large, hoping that the contradic-
tion in terms could somehow be overcome. Theirs was then a kind of 
internal and hesitant revisionism. So at the end they in fact refused to 
call a spade a spade. 
But there was another and deeper reason for their discomfort than 
the idolatry with which Mao had become endowed, and that had more 
to do with belief and less with particular practicalities. If one follows 
the line of separation between religion and political religion in terms of 
their relative capacities for moral replenishment, religion appeals to the 
hereafter, its days of reckoning are salvational. There is no ﬁnal ground-
level denouement. Not so with political religion, which at some point has 
to show results. Moreover, if the moral claims have been placed higher 
than the stakes, even the best political results will be found wanting. 
In China Maoism, insofar as it became a political religion, for all its 
practical revolutionary accomplishments, lacked staying power as a 
belief system. The Cultural Revolution was among other things an effort 
to reinvigorate and revive its religious side, using the myth of Yan'an 
in the process, its very rusticity and primitivism being a crucial part of 
its revolutionary charm, especially to outside observers. It failed not 
only because political religions fail in such endeavours but also because 
Yan'an never was and never could have been a blueprint or a model for 
a modern state. In the end Maoism failed as political religion not least 
of all because of the practical tasks of eradicating illiteracy, poverty and 
corruption endemic in China and making ordinary life easier required 
practical efforts at reform rather than drastic swings in the party line and 
hortatory and visionary appeals that only compounded the disasters. It 
was precisely in order to compensate for the latter that market reforms 
made the most sense—a solution that was anathema to Mao and his old 
guard associates precisely in religious terms—as apostasy. 
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In these regards the contrast between Yan'an and the Cultural Revo-
lution could not have been greater.28 Nor is it so surprising the latter 
virtually destroyed all those who had played important roles in Yan'an, 
pulling each one down from the heroic pantheon in the name of revo-
lutionary renewal even as it proclaimed itself the Second Coming, the 
renewal of Yan'an itself. Whereas in Yan'an Mao's writings, texts and 
speeches were pored over for their meaning, resulting in a form of ex-
egetical bonding similar to that of a religious body, in the Cultural Revo-
lution his excerpted sayings, especially those incorporated in various 
versions of the Little Red Book, became revolutionary boiler plate.29
Mao's reassertion of power was thus accompanied by canonical 
redemptive fantasies, the effects of which produced political, social 
and economic chaos. What may have started as a way of jumping gen-
erations in order to counter the growth of a bureaucracy increasingly 
secular, pragmatic, growth oriented and indifferent to Mao resulted in 
a dictatorship of such fanciful proportions that well before Mao died, 
China was plunged into deep and profound ideological estrangement. 
One outcome of which was to make possible the very outcome Mao 
opposed—China totally preoccupied with growth, development and 
willing to employ capitalism for highly concrete and pragmatic ends 
(Tsou 1986). Such matters have been more than sufﬁciently documented 
and need no further recounting. In hindsight, if in its ﬁrst coming Mao-
ism was the most successful Marxist variant of radical political religion, 
in its second it was the least (MacFarquhar 1974).
Schram's conclusion is that Mao's political role was essentially am-
biguous: 
Eternal Rebel, refusing to be bound by the laws of God or man, nature or 
Marxism, he led his people for three decades in pursuit of a vision initially 
noble, which turned increasingly into a mirage, and then into a nightmare. 
Was he a Faust or Prometheus attempting the impossible for the sake of 
humanity, or a despot of unbridled ambition, drunk with his own power 
and his own cleverness? (Schram 1989: 206) 
He suggests that he was a bit of both.
I would go further. In my view the surviving witnesses hoped that 
the Cultural Revolution would serve as only as an unfortunate political 
spasm in the long history of China. But I think they had caught a glimpse 
of something much bigger than that, something that if grasped at all they 
certainly did not want to discuss or come to grips with—that the Cul-
tural Revolution itself preﬁgured a dying socialism. This is something 
that at the end Mao must have realized even more than the witnesses. 
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How else to explain the sheer desperation of his ﬁnal gesture to stave 
off the inevitable—an inevitable which if it succeeded would reverse 
the doctrinal inevitability of Marxism in all its forms? In this sense the 
Cultural Revolution was a dress rehearsal for what would happen to 
the rest of the socialist 'camp'. 
The late Mao had few dialectical accomplishments. The Cultural Revo-
lution was a last testeronic gasp of an old man swimming upstream in 
a river he could never control. He began to have a schizophrenic vision 
of the cosmos he himself had created, an implosion that produced a 
fantasy of power in the will to destroy. Which perhaps was a throwback 
to his original anarchism. If it is correct to say that Mao's most extraor-
dinary accomplishment as a visionary was to ground it in the concrete, 
to establish prescriptive programmes for highly structured and organ-
ized endgames, in the end it was his original successes in doing these 
things that would prove his undoing. He unleashed a form of idolatry 
that bordered on radical mysticism. In directing his prophetical claims 
against the organizations and structures constituting the party and state, 
he unleashed collective furies tearing down what had been building 
up. The surviving witnesses were not out of sympathy for this. They 
were caught up in the youthful enthusiasm of the Red Guards. Indeed, 
having been disillusioned once before by Stalin and the Soviet Union, 
they were not willing to be easily disillusioned again. But in the end 
they were and with both nostalgia and regret.
An unpublished interview with Rewi Alley, whom my wife and I 
interviewed in 1986 at his home in the residence of the Italian ambas-
sador under Mussolini not long before he died (a place of faded wallpa-
per, lost grandeur and old memories) may serve as an epitaph to both 
Maoism and socialism. In his youth a vigorous outward-bound kind of 
person, now he was conﬁned to a wheelchair and hooked up to vari-
ous medications. But his mind was clear enough. Alley deplored the 
preoccupation with money, the market and the inequalities of growth. 
China's burgeoning growth rate, the introduction of a stock market and 
the evolution of the banking system were for him pretty excruciating 
events. For him Indusco, the old system of cooperatives, was still a valid 
basis for the reconstruction of society. He believed the revolution had 
accomplished much but he was not at all happy with the general loosen-
ing of controls. Indeed in one of his last letters to Mao, he decried the 
spread of sexually explicit literature to which he attributed the growth 
of drug taking among the young. 
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Above all Rewi Alley deplored the Cultural Revolution.30 It represent-
ed the destruction of an ideal—certainly his ideal—indeed his abiding 
faith for most of his entire life in Maoism and the Chinese revolution. 
He came to believe that Mao himself had betrayed both, as he expressed 
in the interview: 
Rewi Alley: I don't think the [Cultural] Revolution was very kind to Mao. It 
put him on a pedestal and gave him absolute power. He had a number of 
very grave weaknesses. One was that he allowed himself to be surrounded by 
very poor elements—Jiang Qing. I think that was very sad. As he got older, 
of course, old age took over. He became an old man with Parkinson's very 
highly developed. He had Parkinson's very badly. He could no longer present 
the front he would have liked to present. What I found so sad was that he 
turned on all the people who helped him make the revolution, the very cream 
of them, and he would have turned on Zhou Enlai but died before he could. 
Apter: Did he really understand what he was doing?                                     
Rewi Alley: He had that evil genius Kang Sheng at his side all the time putting 
thoughts into his ear.31 
It was a melancholy interview ending with that ﬁnal evasion. Mao 
had desecrated the Yan'an ideal all right but Alley could still not bring 
himself to blame Mao directly—rather put it down to Parkinson's dis-
ease, or the wicked ﬁgure of Kang Sheng. Interviews with Israel Epstein, 
Sol Adler and others told much the same story, although they varied to 
some extent about the effects of the turn to market capitalism in China 
today. All saw in China's remarkable economic success at best a very 
mixed blessing, and in revolutionary terms something of an admis-
sion of failure. How wrong they were if one considers how China has 
emerged as the most strikingly successful example of developmental 
change in a world where developmental failure is by far the more com-
mon condition.
Which brings me back to political religion and the witnesses. To 
emphasize the proto-religious aspect of Maoism is not, of course, to 
obscure its military, political and social aspects. Quite the contrary, 
these were the proving grounds of its validity. Nor does it add to our 
understanding just to recount what an evil-doer was the real Mao. More 
important is to account for the fervour and militancy of the Chinese 
communists and the discipline that they were able to maintain under 
extremely harsh circumstances and in terms far more explanatory than 
a description of Mao as tyrant or, for that matter, theories of rational 
choice and ordinary political economy. Rather, exploring Maoism in this 
fashion suggests certain crucial differences between religion and proto-
religion, which is also the difference between religion properly speak-
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ing and political religion. What the Mao case suggests is that religions 
are capable of self-replenishment in a way that political religious are 
not. Political religious beliefs lose their force over time. Efforts to prop 
them up become ritualized. The more they become empty and devoid 
of content, the greater the need to impose orthodoxy as the rationale for 
authority. In terms of China, one can argue that trying to reverse such a 
decline was an important factor in the Cultural Revolution for the latter 
was, in addition to being a power struggle, an effort to bolster a rapidly 
disappearing faith in socialism altogether. In this, it preﬁgured a more 
general decline of socialism everywhere. 
In these terms if we look past the arguments, events and ideological 
claims the witnesses made, and considering how they selected the facts 
they 'saw' with their own eyes (and all were excellent observers), there 
remains a constancy of commitment which, if not in itself religious, 
speaks to a deeper emotional and symbolic attachment to something po-
litically larger than themselves. This attachment, despite its alien origins, 
came to ﬁt with their own American natural inheritance. In part Maoism 
served as a substitute for the religions they had been brought up with 
and the faiths they had lost. It also speaks to their desire for social action. 
If one reads their writings carefully, one sees how important to them 
was the revolution itself as a venue for action and engagement. Perhaps 
to some extent it was also a way of exorcising the fear of loneliness in 
the absence of belief, and of being so often out of step with prevailing 
opinion. Such personal factors also help us understand why it is that 
belief in politics keeps coming back in religious forms. 
The Chinese revolution, if nothing else, shows how deep rooted is the 
desire to believe and how important an ingredient in political action. 
It also suggests that if political religion fails, as socialism has failed, it 
leaves a space which real religion can ﬁll, not least of all by its more 
virulent forms, most particularly of a fundamentalist and evangelical 
kind. It is not a comforting thought. 
David E. Apter is Henry J. Heinz Professor Emeritus of Comparative Political 
and Social Development; Senior Research Scholar, Yale University.
NOTES
* An earlier version of this paper was presented at a conference on Mao at the Fair-
banks Center, Harvard University in December 2003.
1  Presentism as used here represents the imposition of criteria of the here and now 
on the then and there.
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2  Mostly it is historians who serve this purpose. One thinks for example of Tocqueville, 
who was one of the deﬁning ﬁgures in the interpretation of the American political 
experience. How he is reinterpreted is a way of redeﬁning how the American expe-
rience is itself understood. Much the same could be said of Michelet on the French 
revolution. Although he lived after the events, he was writing in their immediate 
aftermath. His monumental work on the subject served as a point of departure for 
subsequent revision of that revolution and also the character of historiography on 
the subject.
3  In effect their views of Mao, Maoism and the Chinese communists, especially in the 
period roughly from 1936 to 1942, were essentially salvational with Yan'an both a 
redoubt and a microcosm for China as a whole, and remained so in their minds long 
after it became apparent that Yan'an could never be a model for anything other than 
itself. See Saich (1996).
4  All the more so because in China history seemed to repeat itself. Previous American 
intervention in Russia and the refusal to recognize the Soviet state they considered 
totally counterproductive. Now in China the United States was pouring funds and 
armaments into the coffers of GMD in a desperate effort to forestall communism. 
The results were to worsen already deteriorating conditions, and with little to show 
for it other than corruption, warlordism and the intensiﬁcation of the already severe 
social suffering of ordinary Chinese. More to the point, much of the weaponry wound 
up in communist arsenals. Moreover these witnesses saw in the West a punitive 
capitalism, democracies caught in the vice of political opportunism and paralysis, 
and around them rising militarism in Japan, not to speak of the spread of fascism 
and Nazism. For all three there remained the residual resonance of the America as 
New Jerusalem with its Puritan past and high moral resolve. They thought they 
could see in the Chinese communists a similar kind of commitment. To the extent 
that they committed brutal acts, these were regarded as ripostes to atrocities and 
at worst unfortunate concomitants in the course of transforming a reactionary and 
feudal society. They fervently hoped that the end product would accord with uni-
versal principles: greater equality, education and freedom. For such ends they were 
willing to countenance the need for a tutelary party with its eye on the future and 
its feet on the ground, turning their eyes from its increasingly authoritarianism, its 
bureaucratic ruthlessness, and the purging propensities driven by party factionalism. 
It was only as China became more and more visibly oppressive that they began to 
look askance; as happened for example, with Eugene Lyons and Freda Utley among 
many others. 
5  They were also competitive, vying for favour within China and the United States. 
Their efforts to 'de-demonize' Mao meant inﬂuencing relations between the United 
States and China. In this they believed they were motivated by genuine concern for 
the United States and where its policies were leading. Purporting to offer balanced 
views of a polarized situation, they gained considerable political inﬂuence. Strong 
carried on a regular correspondence with Eleanor Roosevelt. (Smedley tried to do 
the same but was given the cold shoulder.) And Snow was extremely inﬂuential 
both in mobilizing public support for China and in his contacts with China hands 
in the State Department and related institutions. Snow was less interested in Marx-
ism than was Strong (although she was never a great Marxist) and much less of 
an anarchist than Smedley. In his preferred 'man from Missouri' role, he gave the 
impression of looking circumstances straight in the face, to tell it like it was to all 
and sundry whether they liked it or not. Perhaps better than the others, Snow was 
keenly aware of the limits of what could be said. But all three were good at sensing 
the way the wind was blowing and all knew the requirements of self-censorship. 
34_______________________ The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 22•2005
David E. Apter _____________________________________________________________
6  Later to be excoriated as apologists and fellow travellers. Efforts to posthumously 
annul Duranty's Pulitzer Prize were only recently rejected.
7  So much did Helen Snow relive the days of Yan'an that her eighteenth-century house 
became like a cave, with shrubs covering the walls and hanging from the ceiling.
8  She was particularly good at tidbits. For example, she told me that it was at her in-
sistence (she threatened to leave him) that the biographical materials in Red Star over 
China remained in the book, Edgar Snow intending to delete it because he believed 
it too politically sensitive. 
9  It was also possible to interview some of those who had originally supported but 
then turned against the Chinese communists, most particularly Michael Lindsey.
10  In accord with full disclosure I should say that, like a number of foreign observers, 
I am a member of the Three S Society.
11  For a detailed discussion of Mao's thought see Schram (1989).
12  Rewi Alley, perhaps the most devoted of all the China hands, wrote a short book on 
those he considered the most signiﬁcant, particularly Anna Louise Strong, Agnes 
Smedley and Edgar Snow. There were of course many others. See Alley (1985).
13  Rewi Alley was himself a New Zealander, a member of the New Zealand Com-
munist Party, who went to China to do social work when still young, and wound 
up establishing industrial cooperatives. Israel Epstein was a refugee who made his 
way across Siberia to Japan, and then to Shanghai, to serve as a United Press cor-
respondent and despite rough handling during the Cultural Revolution remained 
an apologist. Michael  Snow, speaking of the visits they made to China in the early 
1970s said, 'They lied to us.' She indicated that so outraged was she by this, that she 
had considered disinterring the remains of Edgar who had been buried in China 
and returning them to the United States.
14  Smedley, for example, 'regarded the Red Army as revolutionary organization of the 
poor' (1970: 142).
15  Their personal histories reinforced this position. All traced their families back to 
colonial times. Those born in heartlands like Nebraska and Missouri, and who had 
come of age in Colorado, California and Washington among other places, were 
nomads in search of something, not least of all themselves. This marked them off 
as independent minded, whatever their political preferences. Smedley remained a 
romantic revolutionary throughout and her clientele was at times more Indian and 
Asian than American. For her the Chinese revolution was attractive less because it 
was communist than that it was revolutionary. It was revolution that she believed 
in. Indeed, so revolutionary was she, particularly with respect to such bourgeois 
institutions as marriage, or what she regarded as the intrinsically degrading char-
acter of male–female sexual relations, that eventually she offended the Puritanism 
of the Chinese communists who expelled her from Yan'an. 
16  Anna Louise Strong, with her Congregationalist background, settlement house 
propensities, and belief that the communists were the new Puritans, was shocked 
when she found herself an object of suspicion in the Soviet Union. Indeed, deserted 
by her old friend Borodin, she was expelled from the Soviet Union and her Russian 
husband disappeared. For her China was thus a place of refuge.
17  Cited in Strong and Keyssar (1983: 346).
18   As to their own beliefs, all were 'lapsed' from conventional religions—Smedley and 
Snow from Catholicism, Strong from Congregationalism. Stalinism certainly put 
them all off, at least at some point. So too did the Cultural Revolution. But religious 
beliefs are never only about religion. 
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19  Such as Maria-Antonietta Macciocci (to her later embarrassment) not to speak of the 
variety of Mao cultists among European and American intellectuals, writers, artists, 
etc. See Macciocchi (1971).
20  As he was dying Snow received a letter from Richard Nixon that said he wanted Snow 
to know that his 'distinguished career is so widely respected and appreciated'.  
21  Struggles within were not simply power struggles, although of course they were 
that, but they were also a competition over which 'truths' would prevail. The bat-
tles over the correct lines, left and right, were analogous to schisms and divisions 
within the church. Indeed, one common link between Soviet purges and conﬂicts 
within the CPP were the campaigns to root out Trotskyism, a process that in China 
was incorporated in the early Rectiﬁcation Campaigns. For the details of such early 
struggles within the Chinese Communist Party, see Saich (1996). 
22  In these regards there are parallels between Lenin's redemptive communism and 
those of Russian writers and intellectuals such as Dostojevsky, who believed that 
it was in Russia that the Kingdom of God on Earth would arrive, and transform all 
mankind. As for Mao, Schram notes that what set him apart was his 'overwhelming 
conﬁdence in his own capacity for leadership. Not only did he admire strong rulers 
East and West, from the founders of the Ch'in and Han dynasties to Peter the Great 
and Napoleon, but he was plainly convinced, from early manhood, of his ability to 
emulate them. Such supreme self-conﬁdence does not in itself guarantee that the 
possessor will play a signiﬁcant political role, but it is very difﬁcult to be an effective 
political leader without it.' See Schram (1989: 7).
23  With rectiﬁcation went justiﬁcation. One applauded the specially created revolution-
ary instruments that pretended to follow institutionally recognized public proce-
dures and gave a veneer of legality to arbitrary decisions about guilt, dissent and 
betrayal. Moreover, although supposedly internalized by poring over appropriate 
texts containing Mao's illuminating insights, even the orthodox could be subject to 
doubts. Political sin and guilt, unlike ordinary crimes, were a matter of social deﬁle-
ment requiring puriﬁcation by exorcizing and eliminating transgressors. No matter 
one's rank or position, one's conviction and ethical purity were always subject to 
suspicion. Individuals, as individuals, had to be tested repeatedly in public rituals, 
public confession leading to self-abasement. Since rectiﬁcation required the elimina-
tion of doubt, the object was to locate the guilty core in each individual no matter 
how devoutly doctrinal he or she claimed to be. For that a standard of judgment was 
required, one that invoked synoptic sayings, made certain texts sacred, consecrated 
special cadres, all accompanied by public spectacle that was at times sheer theatre. 
As a process Mao became a ﬁgure larger than life with justice as an expression of 
public 'wrath'. Expressed through the party in the name of the people rather than the 
glory of god—and repeated on a more massive scale during the Cultural Revolution, 
Maoism used on both occasions the same lord high executioner, Kang Sheng.
24  For example, as if to distance himself a little from the Chinese communists as well 
as to disarm his American readers, he referred to the Chinese communists as 'Reds', 
a term conventionally less than endearing. 
25  And so it seemed to be, as long as one did not support the wrong line. To do so 
revealed the other face of Yan'an, and not nearly as kindly as Snow and the other 
witnesses made out. Indeed, Snow's later accounts gloss over the fact that those in 
the party who chose to see Mao's prescriptions as moral pretence more than Marx-
ist enlightenment, and refused to toe the Maoist line, were ruthlessly eliminated, 
among them Wang Ming, Zhang Goato, Liu Zhidan and Wang Shiwei. See Apter 
and Saich (1994).
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26  In this sense the difference between Yan'an and the Cultural Revolution was pro-
found and the changing role of Mao was only part of it. In Yan'an not even Mao's 
most ardent admirers would have considered him in godlike terms, or even in 
some mystical sense larger than life. In the Cultural Revolution his image became 
both omnipresent and more remote. His actual portrayal became more and more 
stylized, ageless, frozen, virtually emotionless and, replicated in countless statues 
and portraits, Buddha-like. The more public adulation attached to his person, the 
more remote he became, a ﬁgure of abstract personalism.
27  And one very different from the portrait of Mao written during the early Yan'an days 
by Edgar Snow. Indeed, the latter ignored the process even though it was going on 
while he was in Yan'an itself. See Snow (1971: 35).
28  Schram calls it a breviary (1989: 174).
29  He too had been savaged along with virtually all the other signiﬁcant ﬁgures of his 
generation (and losing his lifetime collection of Chinese antiquities).
30  Interview, July 1986.
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